I realise you have been waiting some time now for the fourth talk in my short series on the Middle East following my sabbatical there last year. Despite several kind urgings to speak, especially now that the Palestinians have received their pretty predictable response at the UN to their request for statehood, I have decided to postpone it until the new year. The fact is that the region has recently experienced and continues to experience such profound changes - throwing much egg on the faces of many self-styled and even respected Middle East commentators in the process - that accurate analysis and prediction are indeed hard to construct, not least because so much of the information available needs to be disinfected of the many prejudices and propaganda elements (from both inside and outside of the region) from which it suffers so much.
However, here is a short paper considering some of the things to note and look out for as you read or see reports in the media in order to help you make a little more sense of what is actually going on there and why. I will concentrate on Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Israel-Palestine, referring in each case to the plight of Christians in those countries whom I would ask you to remember in your prayers along with, as we must, those who persecute them. I am always happy to receive any questions or comments by email.
Tribalism and foreign interference remain the two greatest constraints on political, social, and religious freedom and progress in the Middle East. For all the recent hype from Arab intellectuals and western pundits concerning the political maturity of the ‘Arab Spring’, the fact remains that these two factors exert a near stranglehold on any progress towards more democratic, egalitarian, and free societies in the region. That some Europeans drew a few lines in the sand in the last century to create new political entities has not altered one bit the essential tribal nature – even in the cities – of middle eastern society: it is still a case of ‘not what you know, but whom you know’; although, in the case of the more repressive regimes, it is more often than not neither ‘what you know’ nor ‘whom you know’ but ‘what you know on whom’ that pays the handsomest dividends! With few exceptions, loyalties are first and foremost to family and to tribe before ever they are to state or even to religion.
The presence of oil and the opportunity for arms sales mean that foreign (largely western) political ambitions will continue to trump any aspirations to statehood, democracy, and genuine religious freedom in the region if such do not fit in squarely with those countries’ economic or commercial imperatives.
Not only did US companies manage to circumvent earlier UN trade boycotts on Iraq by using third parties, the US government itself has been encouraging (actively but secretly) the Kurds to seek formal independence: indeed, ExxonMobil have already signed an oil deal there! Again, local anger at British arms sales to tyrants invites considerable anger on the Arab street – whatever the security or peace-keeping gloss put on each deal.
Such interference completely undermines the credibility of the US and the UK in the region.
Whilst Arabs and Iranians are not astonished at the recent US sanctioned Israeli assassinations of Iranian nuclear experts, many do still see the US as the only hope of brokering any kind of solution to the Palestinian issue, an issue that will become more, not less, conspicuous on the foreign policy agendas of those countries recently freed from tyrannical regimes, whether or not they become Islamist or manage, against the odds and contrary to character and historical experience, to create some kind of recognisably democratic entity. Any full scale war on Iran whether by either Israel alone or backed by the US and Saudi Arabia would only serve to make the Iranian regime more stable, not less, handing them carte blanche to oppress the non-theocratic opposition and the Christian minorities, albeit that both, miraculously, are growing in Iran.
(Paradoxically, it has been under two politically repressive regimes, Iraq and Syria, that Christians have enjoyed far greater freedom than in the countries of some of the West’s greatest allies (Saudi Arabia, for example). There, secular dictators suppressed both political and religious threats to their power but allowed considerable freedom of religious practice. This was also true to a slightly lesser extent in Egypt under Mubarak but, like Iraq after the invasion, life for Christians has become much more dangerous there now. This is one of the reasons why very few Christians in Syria, however much they would like political reform, seek the removal of Assad. It is significant to note that the protesters have endeavoured to play down the relative silence and lack of support for their cause in Damascus and Aleppo: but these two largest centres of population represent very considerable numbers. When I visited both last year, residents there made the point that they were content to do without a few western style freedoms for the sake of the stability they did enjoy.)
The Retention of Power is a huge factor when considering regime change in the region, embattled tyrants rarely going quietly unless they can take a good portion of their wealth with them: they know that once out, out; and all their many dependents with them.
Few could not be greatly moved by the massive popular protests across the region this
year - largely non-violent, secular, and focussing on dignity, social justice, and freedom; but Gaddafi hung on for as long as he could, the army still holds the reins in Egypt (Mubarak was an expendable figurehead) and will almost certainly fight if necessary in order to maintain its privileged position, whilst Assad still holds Syria against a toothless Arab League and a Europe and America most reluctant and too overstretched to intervene, relying on domestic fears of chaos to maintain his position. ‘Better 40 years of tyranny than one night of anarchy’, says the old Arab proverb. How long he will remain therefore is very much open to debate; it is certainly not the same situation as Libya. The failed western, war-imposed ‘democratisation’ project which led to the destruction of Iraq and the deaths of thousands of Iraqis certainly helps to keep Assad in power. Also, the Syrian opposition still remains scattered and weakened by power struggles and ideological differences: the pictures in our newspapers and on the TV do not tell the whole story by any means! But Assad has to battle against high educated youth unemployment and food shortages. It is all still very much up for grabs. And then of course there is always Iran lurking in the shadows!
Iran faces a very fragile domestic situation, more so than many other Arab states, manifesting continuing tensions throughout society on account of favouritism and corruption within the regime and growing calls for greater democratic representation from without. The regime has been deeply troubled by the non-sectarian, non-violent, democratic groundswell across the region which has given renewed encouragement to the opposition at home. This represents an ideal opening for western countries to redeem their tarnished records and render whatever support possible to the opposition.
This, not war, is the best way forward for Israel and the US; but whether or not the hawks in the increasingly right-wing Israeli government want to see this is another matter entirely. The fact is that it suits the Israeli right and US political and economic interests to allow this very useful bogeyman to remain in power – albeit without a nuclear capability - just as it suits the Iranian regime to have the bogeyman of Israel as a major factor in the rationale for the continuance of their theocratic oligarchy. But, very interestingly, when spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei was supported by the regime in declaring that the result of the blatantly rigged 2009 election was a blessing from God and ought not therefore to be questioned, this prompted other spiritual leaders within the regime to question such exceedingly dubious theology. Evidently there are still considerable rifts within the various groupings that make up the regime. Although increasing oil revenues and with it increasing patronage of key allies and even opponents have, at least temporarily, papered over some of the cracks in the regime’s unity, increasing favouritism, mismanagement, and corruption may well prove to be the last straws and an increasingly radicalised, frustrated, and aggressive opposition eventually take to the streets once again but with much greater determination and in considerably more numbers. The underground Church meanwhile – estimated conservatively at in excess of one million Iranians – will be under greater pressure from the regime, being very useful scapegoats. The regime will continue to support Hezbollah (party of God) in the Lebanon, and in doing so provide another good reason for Israel’s reluctance to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian question.
Palestine remains anything but a marginal or forgotten issue in the region. Arab democrats, should they win the day, will be far less tolerant of Palestinian disenfranchisement than was Arab autocracy. With Israel continually seeking to put off negotiations about a two-state solution and, instead, escalating settler land grabs in the occupied Palestinian territories beyond the Green Line and dispossessing Arab residents of East Jerusalem, the Palestinian Authority saw their only hope for progress in an attempt to win statehood at the UN. It was never going to happen because the Israeli Right cannot, philosophically, allow it to happen: and whilst they remain in power the fact that an increasing number of Israelis can now see that their future depends not upon military domination but upon a political solution is largely immaterial. As one Jewish journalist put it to me, ‘The attacks on the Peace Now movement and civil rights organisations by the Israeli Right is reminiscent of the Germany of 1938: we are creating a new nightmare for our children and our children’s children.’ Within Shin Bet itself, settler radicalism is now seen as a major problem!
The Palestinian Authority is in reality not strong enough either to present a united Palestinian front or to take on a far more powerful Israel at the negotiating table. It remains the case that only the US can bring sufficient weight to bear on Netanyahu and the Israeli Right: yet Obama is not only constrained by next year’s US election but also by those among his financial backers who support Israel without reservation. Even if Obama were to secure a second term it remains highly unlikely in my opinion that he would be able to apply the necessary pressure to shift the Israeli Right. Indeed I cannot see any just solution until more Israelis themselves perceive that Netanyahu is pursuing an ultimately suicidal policy and so vote him out and a more rational and reasonable cabinet in. (Sadly, the increasingly harsh, anti-democratic legislation finding its way into the Israeli statute books does not augur well!) The US and other Arab countries could then exert their political, economic, and military will to ensure – and it is possible if they are willing to be strong – the safety of Israel within her internationally recognised legal borders. The alternative to this is simply too awful to contemplate: an increasing number of reasoning Israelis realise this and should be supported at every turn. Sadly, I suspect that the hawks, the arms industry, and the diabolical extremists on the Christian Right in the US will call the tune for the foreseeable future.
How things will now play out in the region will depend upon which of the two realities below eventually wins the day. So is your glass half full or half empty? Because of the range and immediacy of new means of popular communication – as was made only too clear in the recent revolutions – many more people, especially the educated and informed young, are now far more aware of their marginalisation and of discrimination against them. It has already been proved that tyrants can be brought down by non-violent protest if numbers are sufficient, albeit at great personal cost to some. This young, informed, but largely either underemployed or unemployed demographic bulge in the region has within it the potential - provided the West does not interfere but instead supports - to effect some incredibly healthful changes there. On the other hand, they must contend with extremely powerful, greedy, reactionary, and morally and theologically reprehensible elites both within and beyond the region who have no intention whatsoever of giving up their greed or status. So whom we support, what we pray for, and how we act is not unimportant.
Campbell Paget 10th November 2011
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